Knowledge, responsibility, decision making and ignorance: by Huniche, Lotte
Summary
This article is concerned with the question of how to
argue about morality and ethics in relation to a severe
and deadly hereditary disease. It is inspired by the
uneasiness I have felt on a number of occasions when
“right and wrong” is being discussed by persons at
risk, professionals and in particular when discussed
by outsiders. This task is not an easy one and the ar-
ticle tries to lay out more groundwork than it arrives
at conclusions. Below follows a brief introduction to
my framework and some of the concepts that are im-
portant for my way of outlining the arguments that
follow. Then I take a closer look at genetic knowl-
edge, responsibility and decision making, because
these seem to be important issues in my field of
study. I have added ignorance to the list in order to
discuss a further aspect of dealing with hereditary
disease. Interestingly, ignorance (understood both as
being ignorant of and ignoring) seems to be com-
monly applicable to describing persons living at risk
for Huntington’s Disease (HD). So what does every-
day conduct of life look like from an “ignorance”
perspective? And how can we discuss and argue
about morality and ethics taking these seemingly di-
verse ways of living at risk into account? Posing this
question, I hope to contribute to new reflections on
possibilities and constraints in people’s lives with
HD as well as in research and to open up new ways
of discussing “right and wrong”.
A framework
At present, medical genetics is rapidlybringing about new genetic knowl-edge while its associated tech-
nologies offer new choices between different
courses of action. Hence the field of medical
genetics prompts persons living at risk of
hereditary disease to reflect on their situation
and to act in moral accordance with what
they know. This moral prompting is not in-
herent to genetic science or practice as such.
It comes about through our understanding of
the relation between knowledge and respon-
sible decision making in our part of the
world. Namely the former as a solid founda-
tion for the latter. According to this logic, ig-
norance (in both senses) can be staged as
problematic in as far as it limits persons at
risk in acting responsibly towards family and
offspring. You have to make use of genetic
knowledge in order to be living and choosing
responsibly. In this article I will discuss the
widespread notion of knowledge as true and
fixed in order to show that it is not beyond
uncertainty, ambiguity and negotiation when
used as a basis for responsible decision mak-
ing. I will argue that the fast changing and
situated nature of knowledge and technology
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makes it difficult to maintain that entering
the domain of “knowing” assures responsi-
ble decision making in a universal or ab-
solute manner. It also makes it difficult to
judge ignorance irresponsible per se. Along
these lines, attributing universal value to in-
formed decision making can be problema-
tised as staging the possibility for rendering
this course of action more responsible than
any other and hence of a higher moral or
ethical standard. I will end up by arguing that
we have to move away from the understand-
ing of ignorance as inherently “wrong” when
considering the nature of knowledge and the
way responsibility and decision making are
enacted in people’s everyday lives. Instead
we have to engage in people’s 1. person per-
spectives1 on their own situated participation
in concrete social practice. Doing so, we
might be able to say something about how
ignorance works in people’s lives, for them-
selves as individuals as well as for their fam-
ilies and relationships. Hence our moral and
ethical concerns should be connected to how
people navigate through life, taking wider
familiar, social and societal implications into
account and should not be about creating a
set of decontextualised rules to be followed
regardless. This does not mean that we can
avoid making use of culturally available
maps and tools (ethics, norms, standards, ar-
guments etc.) in order to navigate socially,
but we can try to reflect how and why we do
this as we go along considering relevance
and meaning in our personal conduct of life.
Finally, acting ethically from a 1. person per-
spective, does not do away with the possibil-
ity of creating problems on a different level
of human life. For example, sometimes per-
sonal ethical navigation with severe heredi-
tary disease involves decision making and
acting with respect to procreation. With due
consideration to the diversity of personal
choices, this could be viewed as a kind of
“eugenic” practice of our time on a societal
level. A practice of judging lives more or less
worthy, not argued with race and orchestrat-
ed by states, but argued with health and en-
acted by individuals. The business of judging
and sometimes discarding of lives is proba-
bly inherent to humanity, but the way we
think, argue and act in relation to it, should
continuously be the focus of consideration. I
shall return to this discussion in the conclud-
ing section of this article.
Everyday conduct of life with
Huntington’s Disease
At present, I am working on a projectto explore some of the practices andtechnologies of medical genetics
and their impact on the conduct of everyday
life. In particular my study focuses on people
at risk for Huntington’s Disease (HD). This
“at risk” population represents a new group
of users in health care, not actually ill but at
risk of becoming ill at a later stage of their
lives. In medical terms HD is a neurode-
generative disease attacking the central ner-
vous system. Symptoms involve involuntary
movements of the entire body along with a
specific form of dementia. HD has a mean
onset of 35 to 45 years of age, but symptoms
can become manifest at any age. Usually
symptoms progress until death after 10-15
years, but longer periods of illness are not
uncommon, some extending into very old
age. As you might suspect, HD is amongst
the severest of the known hereditary ill-
nesses. There is, as yet, no known cure, no
way of postponing the outbreak of symp-
toms or delaying their progress. In a few in-
stances involuntary movements might be
eased medically. Statistically 50% of the
members of any affected family will inherit
36
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Outlines-2001-1.qxd  19-06-01  13:31  Side 36
the mutation and hence develop the desease
at some point. Put differently there is a 50%
risk that any affected parent will pass on the
desease to each of his or her children. If the
HD mutation is not passed on to a child this
person will not become ill and will not pass
on the mutation to succeeding generations.




In my work the concepts of everyday con-duct of life and personal trajectories ofparticipation across contexts have be-
come solid analytical tools. My way of
thinking about “lives with HD” and the way
I go about researching these lives is rooted in
German Critical Psychology (Holzkamp
1985). In this line of theorising, the basic un-
derstanding of persons is not informed by an
essence of personality or by traits, but in-
formed by the way people conduct their
everyday lives across contexts of social prac-
tice. Subjectivity and action are concepts ba-
sically indicating that we would not be the
way we are if not in plural. They point to the
related and active nature of humanity and
suggest a way of understanding the connect-
edness of persons in society, which is neither
functionalist nor structuralist. Social psy-
chology has long been struggling with the
analytical distinction of person/society and it
has proven difficult to weave this distinction
together into a more complex, relational and
organic understanding. Critical Psychology
makes this attempt by conceiving of persons
as embedded in larger socio-historical and
cultural practices, acting in ways that are
both structuring and structured in concrete
contexts of social practice. The plurality of
contexts is a recent theoretical development
suggested by Ole Dreier (1999). Dreier’s
point of departure is a particular critique of
Klaus Holzkamp’s “Grundlegung der Psy-
chologie”2, where persons are conceived as
participants in social practice abstracted
from the concrete myriad of contexts that
constitutes everyday life. Dreier thus speaks
of persons participating in multiple contexts,
in varied but related ways. This transforma-
tion from the singular to the plural helps us
understand how personal participation in one
context is formed in part by how we partici-
pate in other contexts and how there may be
differing ways of participating in differing
contexts. These differing ways are related to
our positions and perspectives, our possibi-
lities and limitations, analysed as conditions,
with meaning (for us), connected to our rea-
sons (grounds) for doing things when going
about living our lives.
Contradictions
An important concern of mine is tounderstand how contradictions workin people’s everyday lives. In a
Critical Psychological framework contradic-
tions can be viewed as an integral part of
how people live and participate in ongoing
social practices, as well as of how profes-
sional and societal practices work. This un-
derstanding is opposed to viewing contradic-
tions as dysfunctions or failures in the art of
living, as would be the case in some cogni-
tivist, rationalist and dynamic traditions.
Furthermore, the concept of participation is
connected to an understanding of human de-
velopment as an ongoing process where con-
tinuity and change are part of the life long
struggle of being and becoming a certain
kind of person. In other words we have to
make an effort to maintain well established
ways of life (routines) and to change in line
with changing conditions, needs and inter-
ests. Practice refers both to how persons en-
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gage in living their everyday lives, but also to
the professional practices that are there to
serve us, and which we may or may not
make use of. Furthermore practice refers to
wider societal practices, such as the emer-
gence of research strategies and priorities,
the development of technologies and treat-
ment regimes. Thus the term practice sup-
ports the project of weaving together the un-
derstanding of “persons in society”, in as far
as it prompts us to analyse how various prac-
tices come to play a part in people’s lives.
This is one of the points where the scope of
my research fades out and I start looking in
other directions for further elaboration of so-
cietal analysis to inform my work. The fields
of sociology and medical anthropology have
made useful contributions in this regard as
they treat such questions in more detail
(Novas & Rose 2000, Mattingly 1998, Rapp
2000).
Research approach
Iam engaging in the field of investigationad modum action research (Lewin 1948,Argyris 1985, Whyte 1991, Jyrkämä
1996) or more specifically practice research
in the Critical Psychological tradition.3 Prac-
tice research is a way of acknowledging the
involvement of research in practice. Speci-
fically the involvement of research in devel-
oping ways of thinking and going about
dealing with people’s lives in practice. In-
stead of trying to do away with the meaning
of my research for the people that I inter-
view, work with and others who have to ac-
cept me as a further aspect of the HD public
arena, I try to understand and conduct my re-
search in accordance with how I would like
to participate, contribute and make a differ-
ence. A way of making my mind up about
such difficult questions is trying to stay fo-
cused on what moves the lives of persons liv-
ing with HD, their 1. person perspectives. I
also find this focus helpful with respect to not
slipping unthinkingly into the problems,
dilemmas and developments of professional
practice. Problems of institutional practice
sometimes draw our attention away from the
fact that persons at risk of inherited disease
face changing conditions and problems, so
that professional practice has to change ac-
cordingly in order to stay relevant. One way
of aiming at making changes relevant is pay-
ing close attention to the changing conditions
and problems in people’s everyday lives and
to reflect in what ways professional practice
can be of assistance to these persons.
Why this focus?
Psychological research into HD hasmainly dealt with generating statisticalaccounts related to events taking place
within a narrow proximity of the profession-
als working in the field. That is in relation to
genetic counselling, genetic testing, repro-
ductive technologies, diagnosing etc. In this
line of research, people at risk are represent-
ed in the form of pre- and post morbid per-
sonalities or traits, coping skills and strate-
gies, standard reactions to presymptomatic
genetic testing etc. To my knowledge only a
small percentage of the literature addresses
the social and psychological concerns of
people who live with HD.4 Therefore, it is
my contention that psychological research at
this point in time should be about how peo-
ple live when at risk for HD, how they con-
duct their lives and what issues are of con-
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Outlines-2001-1.qxd  19-06-01  13:31  Side 38
cern to them. The focus is thus not one of
disease in and of itself, but of how, where
and when disease becomes an important is-
sue and how it is sometimes not an issue at
all. It seems that the importance and place of
HD changes over time, with changes in life
conditions and shifts in what people are con-
cerned with in their lives. It also changes
along with what technologies and other pro-
fessional assistance is “on offer” etc. This fo-
cus on how people conduct their lives and on
their 1. person perspectives I find important
and potentially useful with respect to 4 con-
cerns. Firstly, understanding people strugg-
ling to live lives with HD – and other hered-
itary diseases. Secondly, informing profes-
sional practice and dealing with questions
raised in such contexts. Third, informing re-
search in the social sciences and related
work. Fourth, informing political decision
making. It is my hope to participate in the
development of a theory that can potentially
deal with all four of these aspects by hanging
on to the personal perspectives of those at
risk. Not in isolation, but in connection with
the perspectives of those working in the
field, researchers and policy makers.
How to do research to stay
loyal to this focus?
This is no easy task. Where do you startin order to end where? What do youinclude and what do you reasonably
leave out? Below is a brief overview of my
empirical material and the contexts in which
it has been generated.
I started out by bringing together a small
group of 5 persons with HD in their families
and asked them to tell me what they thought
were important issues in their lives and what
they thought would be important to focus
upon in a psychological research project. I
still remember this first meeting, where a lot
of things were told that I had not imagined
prior to the meeting. The implications for
family relations were especially striking. HD
was portrayed not so much as an individual
concern, but rather an issue involving the ex-
tended family. People did not tell me what
“important issues” they could think of, but
rather they told me their life stories. Stories
about families that had to carry a special bur-
den. Childhood with a father or mother grad-
ually changing, loosing the grip, falling
apart. Parents splitting up, uncertainty about
“what was wrong”, drinking problems. Then
finally a diagnosis. The relief of knowing
and then the realisation that other family
members, grandmother, an uncle, had the
same “thing” and that it might hit you, your
brothers and sisters, your cousins. Some re-
maining unaffected. Like flipping a coin
50/50. The cruelty of this, the injustice.
Visits to the nursing home, extended over
years, the disease displaying all its horrors
until finally your parent dies. Feelings of
guilt about not visiting. The inability to face
your parent utterly helpless, knowing you
might end up the same way. Feelings of let-
ting an ex-wife or ex-husband down, too
much water under the bridge. Glimpses of
hope for your own future, the future of your
children. Enhanced feelings of responsibility
and duty to know. Such were these first sto-
ries. To me they were overwhelming. I did
not take many notes during the meeting, but
wrote extensively afterwards. Along with
meeting these 5 individuals I also began to
participate in counselling sessions. Gradu-
ally I have become an active part of the ses-
sions, although the final professional respon-
sibility has always rested with the medical
geneticist. I do not write down notes during
these sessions, as counselling is not a point
of focus in itself, but I do write down my re-
flections on the role and importance of coun-
selling in people’s lives as a whole. Another
valuable source of information has been staff
meetings (and lunches) at the genetics de-
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partment. Here I found a world of its own,
completely foreign to me. I did not under-
stand most of what they talked about in the
beginning, but gradually became familiar
with some of the terminology. Then, of
course, I have conducted interviews. Inter-
views have preferably taken place in
people’s homes, when possible. I quickly
learned that meeting people at the medical
faculty, where they might have come for
counselling on a previous occasion, was not
a good idea. Meeting in these surroundings
made it even more difficult to convince
people that I was really interested in their
everyday lives and not just in the aspects
concerning disease. Usually I saw inter-
viewees on their own but on two occasions I
have had the opportunity to speak with mar-
ried couples. I carried out 18 interviews with
people at risk, some tested and some not, and
2 with professionals working with HD.
Finally I have been lucky enough to be in-
vited to participate during weekends for
healthy, at risk or tested individuals and their
spouses or friends. On these, and similar oc-
casions like the annual general assembly of
the National HD Association, I have taken
field notes in the broad, anthropological
sense of the term. Another line of my work,
which has developed rather slowly, is my en-
gagement in various research communities
that are of relevance. Amongst others, I
would like to mention the importance of ex-
changing notes and having discussions with
the sociologist Carlos Novas, who is also
working on issues related to HD. Starting his
empirical work in places of social import-
ance, such as chat rooms on the internet,
rather than everyday life, he moves towards
an understanding of what and how societal
conditions and developments matter in
people’s everyday lives. Such analysis are
necessary in order to add sociological sub-
stance to our understanding of the related-
ness of “persons in society”. Another source
of inspiration is the work of Mette Nordahl
Svendsen, a Danish anthropologist, looking
into cancer genetic counselling. The empiri-
cal focus of this research project is on user
perspectives on counselling, testing and ge-
netic information with respect to understand-
ing more about the impact of the new genet-
ics on people’s ways of thinking about and
conducting themselves. This is an important
study in relation to my own for several rea-
sons. Firstly, the empirical approach resem-
bles mine, and secondly, the diseases under
scrutiny are somewhat different, both regard-
ing geno- and phenotypes and especially with
regard to possibilities for treatment. It is strik-
ing that in comparing notes, we find parallel
issues being at stake in people’s lives, but their
importance and meaning differ. This is ex-
pressed in ways people live, think and speak
about themselves in relation to disease, how
they make decisions and reason about them.
To sum up, trying to stay loyal to my fo-
cus involves, meeting people at risk in dif-
fering contexts, at differing points in their
lives, with differing family histories and cur-
rent life circumstances and a differing out-
look on the issues and concerns in lives with
HD. And it involves meeting professionals,
researchers and various activists the same
way. That is, in differing contexts, participat-
ing in changing ways, with differing goals
and aims, working conditions, educational
background etc. In this way I am aiming at
pursuing themes of importance for the way
persons at risk conduct their lives. Taking a
practice research approach, I also draw on
principles of anthropological field work.
This means that I am doing as much partici-
pant observation as time and opportunity al-
low me, in order to generate other qualitative
materials apart from the transcriptsof inter-
views. This should allow a broader view of
what people at risk deem relevant and the
ways they go about living, in relation to rele-
vant conditions for doing so.
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What is included by
this focus?
By trying to stay loyal to my projectabout getting as close as I can topeople’s reasons and ways of doing
things, I hope that I can avoid the personalis-
ing tendency of essentialist personality and
traits approaches. To me this means avoiding
the tendency to develop theory that is most
likely to be used to hold people personally
responsible and personally to blame for
whatever life circumstances they have ar-
rived at (Osterkamp 2000) and thus not un-
derstanding their subjective reasons and per-
spectives. I also hope to keep my own moral
convictions at a manageable level. In other
words, I have set myself the task of trying to
stay humble in order to understand what the
other person understands, as Kierkegaard
has put it. Not that I intend to go all soft and
uncritical on my material and the people I
develop personal relationships with (that
would not do them any good anyway), but in
order to do them and their ways of life jus-
tice by framing the understanding of their
lives in a broader socio-historical and cultur-
al perspective. This focus provides me with a
frame for thinking about subjective condi-
tions, meanings and reasons in lives with se-
vere, disabling and deadly familial disease. It
has opened my eyes to the fact that all of this
becomes important or finds a place in
peoples lives in differing ways, at differing
times, for various reasons and sometimes not
at all. A point in case would be the fact that
10-12% of people living at risk take the ge-
netic test to establish whether or not they
will become ill at some point in their lives.
Talking to people in differing life circum-
stances, at different ages it becomes apparent
that there is much more involved in taking
the test than the need to know, responsibility
towards offspring, planning the future etc.
There is a lifetime of experiences with or
without the knowledge of HD being in the
family. People tell different stories about
what has been of importance, how and when,
before they arrived at actually going through
with testing. The same can be said about
people who have not (yet) been tested, but
are aware of the possibility.
Deciding where to look
and what to look for
It is striking that the key concepts I wasconfronted with when I rather ignorantly,started exploring this field were concepts
such as late onset disease, risk and testing.
Not the concepts of everyday conduct of life
or personal trajectories of participation
across contexts. The former concepts have
emerged from the field of medical genetics
and the latter from Critical Psychology
(leaning on sociological and anthropological
traditions) trying to understand people in
their “everyday lives” (Holzkamp 1998,
Dreier 1999, Osterkamp 2000, Bech-Jør-
gensen 1994). Immediately apparent have
also been issues of responsibility and deci-
sion making in lives with HD, and the distri-
bution of responsibility for health and
healthy conduct between “persons at risk”,
important others and professionals. These is-
sues become apparent in counselling and
clinics because these are important sites for
negotiating and distributing responsibility
amongst the involved parties. This is reflect-
ed in the movement of theoretical discus-
sions of counselling from “eugenic advice”
in the 1920s and 1930s, towards “non-direc-
tive counselling” in the 1970s, and then
“shared decision making” during the 1990s
(Elwyn et al 2000, Novas 2000, working pa-
per), which marks the changing demands
professionals place on users of health tech-
nology (Dawning, in prep). Counselling and
clinics are important sites for situating ge-
netic knowledge in order to be useful to per-
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sons living at risk and important sites for es-
tablishing what counts as scientific knowl-
edge and what is relegated to the personal
realm of belief (Byron Good 1994). Pro-
fessional practice in this field can therefore
be scrutinised as supporting a certain kind of
“technology of the self”, borrowing a term
from Michel Foucault (1990), taken up by
Nicholas Rose (1998), meaning a certain
foundation for thinking about and conducting
the self. As I see it, the “technology of the
self” offered in the contexts of genetic coun-
selling and clinics is based on the idea of au-
tonomous, informed, rational, and respons-
ible decision-making individuals. It is there-
fore a self-technology that emphasises indi-
vidual decision making and responsibility
while downplaying the wider familial, social
and societal inter-relatedness. It privileges the
logic of genetics almost to the exclusion of
other logics (Duster 1990, Mol and Berg
1994). For example, the genetic logic is of
such primacy in counselling, that I did not
notice it myself, until I encountered a person
at risk for HD who disputed medical genetics
as the fundamental understanding of the dis-
ease. This has only happened once during all
my encounters with persons at risk, marking
a difference from the multitude of lay under-
standings of for example tuberculosis and
cancer (Sontag 1991, Otto 1994, Forchham-
mer 1996, Bowker & Star 1999).
I shall develop this argument further, but
first I would like to ascertain that I am not
opposed to genetic research, counselling or
the new genetic technologies as such. Rather
I am highly critical and at times quite uneasy
with it. Nevertheless, I participate in coun-
selling sessions, I recommend people to see
counsellors or therapists for various reasons
and I do not think anybody should go
through with testing for HD without having
talked to someone who knows about living
life with a test result. We have invented tech-
nologies (psy technologies included) to show
people “who they are” genetically, their
ways of thinking, feeling and acting and we
are thus obliged to participate in the enter-
prise of inventing social technologies dedi-
cated to assist the conduct of lives with what
people have learnt. Furthermore, we are
obliged to make extensive efforts to come to
grips with what this means in a long term
perspective. We might be in the process of
establishing practices that are unproblematic
on an individual level, but taken together
bring about an unwanted societal directional-
ity. This includes bringing about fundamen-
tal changes in human genetic material or
supporting eugenic practices. It seems a like-
ly proposition that “we”, taken as powerful
citizens, scientists and states, cannot be en-
tirely in control of such directionality, but we
are not entirely without means of influence
either. We are changing possibilities and
constraints as we develop genetic research
and practice and we should therefore, as a




Defining the framework of my re-search as everyday life with HD, Iunexpectedly came across an exten-
sive use of specific technologies in medical
practice dealing with HD. Interestingly, I did
not have a technological focus or even an
awareness of the importance of technology
for people living at risk of HD when I first
started in 1998. But as time passes I see my-
self increasingly having to study the tech-
nologies which are in use, as well as in the
making, when researching life at risk for
HD. Firstly, the actual development of re-
search on medical genetics and the develop-
ment of technologies, tools and medical pro-
cedures to match the new findings has sped
up considerably over the last few years.
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Genetic research as we know it has only been
carried out for approximately two decades
but is developing rapidly (Huntington’s
Disease, A Guide for Families5). Secondly,
persons living at risk of any genetically based
disorders only gradually make use of the
technologies that become available. Actual
procedures for offering genetic technologies
to at risk individuals have to be developed
and accepted as possibilities by users before
they become part of the health care regime
and offered as standard procedures (Foucault
1987). Nevertheless, in my experience what-
ever technologies are made available will get
used and will eventually become accepted as
standard procedure. Consider for instance
IVF, which was met with strong opposition
when it was first introduced less than two
decades ago, but is now a standard “medical”
procedure in most modern societies.
Changes in technology as
conditions for responsibility
and choice
Ishall now turn to the questions of re-sponsibility and choice. The develop-ment within medical genetics that I have
just spoken of, can be described as taking
place in multiple contexts, enacted by sub-
jects with varying interests and positions
(Latour 1999, Dreier 1993). In this sense it
can also be described as only partially or re-
gionally orchestrated. One of the implica-
tions is that medical knowledge and technol-
ogy change in not entirely foreseeable ways
and thus conditions for choice in everyday
conduct of life change in ways that are
equally difficult to predict. Persons at risk
plan their futures with access to the present
possibilities and constraints, but without
knowing how these will change (Ettorre
1999). A brief view of the recent history of
genetic testing will serve to illustrate this
point. Let me sketch out a few of the impor-
tant changes in the technology, which in turn
has changed deliberation on responsibility
and choice in peoples lives with HD as well
as in professional practice.
History of HD related
technology
Before the discovery of the HD muta-tion, linkage analysis was carried outfor some years. This was done partly
as a research effort to locate the mutation,
and partly as an offer to persons at risk of
knowing their “genetic status”. Unfortu-
nately, linkage analysis was not always con-
clusive. For instance if key family members
were not available or unwilling to donate a
blood sample, or for technical reasons. The
actual mutation coding for HD was discov-
ered in 1993 after more than 10 years of in-
tensive research (Wexler 1996). This was
considered an encouragement, in as much as
it indicated that genetic research was pro-
gressing towards a more encompassing un-
derstanding of HD and hopefully a cure.
Shortly after the discovery of the mutation
testing became general practice throughout
the western world and a set of international
guidelines of “how to do it” were worked
out. In the mid-1990s the first prenatal diag-
nosis was carried out in Denmark, amount-
ing to a total of 42 today. In 1999 the first at-
tempts at using pre-implantation diagnosis
along with IVF were initiated.
Knowledge as situated
Looking at these developments and thechanging conditions it offers to per-sons at risk, it becomes very hard to
speak of well informed, ethically right and
responsible choices in universal terms. This
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is true for both persons living at risk and pro-
fessionals researching and practising within
the field. The fast and regionally orchestrat-
ed development draws into question our con-
ceptions of knowledge and informed deci-
sion making. How can we be well informed,
or pass on solid information if the informa-
tion and associated technologies are con-
stantly revised? And how then, can decisions
be uniformly ethical? What about the claim
that so called universal and solid genetic
knowledge is ruled by different explanations,
logics and practices (Mol & Berg 1994)? As
in the different practices of genetic science
and counselling, science being a practice
concerned with the production of solid facts
and counselling being a practice where ge-
netic knowledge is situated and negotiated
by professionals in relation to persons at
risk? (Rapp 1988/1995). And what about the
uncertainties and ambiguities that appear
when taking a close and detailed look at
where genetic research stands today?
Knowledge in social practice
Doing field work I have found thatpeople refer to different kinds ofknowledge with respect to HD.
There is “right and wrong” knowledge, “to
much and to little” knowledge according to
contexts and participants. Furthermore, in
counselling certain kinds of knowledge are
promoted as scientific, whereas other kinds
are relegated to the realm of belief. The first
kind is enacted as “right”, the second kind as
“wrong” knowledge (Good 1999). Both pro-
fessionals and persons at risk participate in
establishing borders between knowledge and
belief. As mentioned previously, I have en-
countered one single person at risk who re-
lied more on his own version of his situation
than on medical knowledge. Differences in
what is deemed “right” or “relevant” know-
ledge are also expressed in the fact that I ask
other questions and talk of other subjects, in
the context of counselling, than the medical
geneticist. The medical geneticist tend to
concentrate more on the family history of
disease and on passing on relevant informa-
tion about disease related issues as well as on
consequences for everyday life. I tend to
concentrate more on what all of this means
to people, their concerns, their way of deal-
ing with everyday life and how it makes
them feel here and now. Both of us ask and
talk in relation to the reasons persons state
for coming for counselling, what they know
in advance, what they say they want to know
more about or want to discuss. We think of
“right” or “relevant” knowledge in differing
ways because our understanding of what is at
stake in people’s lives and what should be of
concern in the counselling session differ.
When persons at risk go home, when I go to
take notes on my laptop and the geneticist
speaks to his dictaphone, knowledge is situ-
ated again into a new context with other par-
ticipants, interests and obligations. Whether
knowledge is situated as “right or wrong”
depends on the degree of detail, the theoreti-
cal foundations and the perspective taken.
Several kinds of HD get enacted in coun-
selling sessions, at home, in clinics and do-
ing research (Mol & Berg 1994). Taking a
historical perspective “right and wrong” has
also developed over time, changing the em-
phasis and concerns of geneticists and coun-
sellors (Novas, working paper). It thus
makes more sense to redefine knowledge as
heterogeneous and transformable, partial and
negotiable with respect to context, partici-
pants and interests, as well as to maintain
that knowledge is always related in one way
or another to a perceived materiality. Fur-
thermore, I would argue that having differing
professional perspectives represented is one
way professionals might widen the scope of
the issues addressed and handled in coun-
selling. If such differences are reflected and
44
Outlines-2001-1.qxd  19-06-01  13:31  Side 44
discussed amongst professionals, this could
potentially become a resource for the per-
sons seeking counsel.
Making decisions and living
them
The next issue of concern is that ofmaking and living decisions. It is ob-vious that couples making use of pre-
implantation technology have to engage in
some sort of conscious decision making in
order to arrive at actions that involve their
social lives, bodies and that have serious
consequences for a lifetime. But there is
something about the idea of conscious deci-
sion making that makes me uneasy (Sloan
1996, Dawning in prep). Firstly, conscious
decision making implies a process of rational
cognitive as well as discursive activity and
secondly, the term implies a corresponding
relationship between deliberation and action
as central to understanding how we conduct
our lives. And this is not how I would char-
acterise the way people go about living with
HD in general. That is not how I would char-
acterise the way anybody goes about living
in general. We do not think and talk every as-
pect of our lives and we do not do it in ways
that correspond uniformly to our actions. So
even though I think it makes sense to talk
about choices to indicate differences that
make a difference I also think that we make
more or less explicit decisions all the time as
we go along. Everyday life involves deliber-
ation, decision making, acting, but in round
about ways. When something becomes im-
portant or pressing enough we make explicit
decisions about them. We might even voice
these decisions. But we do not necessarily
carry decisions out at once or at all. And they
may not be rational from all perspectives.
There may be obstacles to a chosen course of
action and we might end up not being able to
live according to our decisions. We constant-
ly revise our plans, change our minds, do dif-
ferently than intended in accordance with the
complexity of daily living. People at risk tell
me about how they made the decision about
having the test long before going through
with it, or how they know they will have the
test sometime in the future, but not exactly
when. Sometimes other issues have to be
settled and lived through first. I have been
told more than once that the death of an af-
fected parent or near relative “made the time
right”.
A problem in making and
living ethical and responsible
decisions
Ishall now move on to illustrate that thefast, regionally orchestrated developmentalong with the situated, uncertain and
ambiguous nature of knowledge draws into
question the idea of setting up universal ethi-
cal standards for decent human conduct with
HD. Ethics and responsible decision making
understood as universals, also have a very
hard time dealing with the complexity and
contradictions of lived life. Taking the notion
of contradictions seriously, it follows that
there will always be aspects of everyday con-
duct which does not fit into a general ethical
framework (Rose 1999, Novas & Rose 2000,
Callon & Rabeharisoa 1999). This is not to
say that we either could nor should refrain
from having ethical standards, just that we
have to think and argue differently about
them. I shall elaborate this further through-
out the rest of the article.
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6 Some persons at risk, people that I talk to about my
project in general and quite a few social or health profes-
sionals express the view that certain specific obligations
for ethical and responsible behaviour rests with persons at
risk of severe hereditary diseases, in particular with re-
spect to having children, informing relatives and potential
partners.
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It is a general reaction6 that persons with
HD in the family should have moral reason
to reflect extensively on their lives and the
decisions they make. This is because HD has
serious implications for children, spouses
and other family members too, as they often
participate in the care of the ill. But far from
everybody does reflect life in such a way
(Callon & Rabeharisoa 1999). In this respect
persons at risk of HD are no different from
the rest of us. Based on the extensive contact
I have had with persons at risk, I find it prob-
able that reflections of how to go about liv-
ing and deciding is just as widespread for
persons living with HD, as with any other se-
rious health concern, and perhaps even in
people’s lives in general. I would like to sup-
port my argument with some statistics. Pre-
sently, there are approximately 1300 persons
living at risk for HD in Denmark, and a fur-
ther 250 persons are ill with the disease.7
How many of these can be said to be active
in the public arenas of HD? There are 675
members of the national HD association (in-
cluding at risk or ill individuals, families, rel-
atives, nursing homes, medical doctors), 300
pre-symptomatic tests have been carried out
so far, and 42 prenatal diagnosis in 30 cou-
ples (11 at risk women, 19 at risk men).
Between 20-40 persons participate at sum-
mer camp for the ill and their care-givers
each year (quite a few participate year after
year), and between 20-30 persons participate
in weekend seminars for young persons at
risk and their partners. Considering that most
active persons are active in more than one
context, I find it unlikely that more than 25
% of persons at risk could be active on any
of the public arenas of HD. For obvious rea-
sons, I seldom engage in contact with those
who are not active. I hear about them from
family members and friends. They are often
talked about by those who are “active” as
“refusing to face the facts”, “not able to cope
with it”, “ignoring problems”, or even “re-
pressing their situation” in the Freudian
sense. Such differences in approach often
pose difficulties for relationships.
Acting on the public arenas
of HD – acting in everyday
life
On that note I find it interesting thatpersons at risk apparently confrontthemselves with knowledge and
awareness of HD (or other serious health
concerns) in various ways, as do the rest of
us. Action possibilities include not doing
anything in particular, dealing with disease
related issues as they occur in everyday prac-
tice, settling for whatever the family passes
around as common knowledge, pursuing in-
formation in other places, checking the inter-
net, joining activist groups, taking out life in-
surance, requesting counselling, having the
genetic test, going for a prenatal diagnosis,
caring for family members. All of this in-
volves some kind of deliberation, decision
making and action. Some persons at risk
claim they have decided to have the test, but
do not actually pick up the phone and make
an appointment for a long while. Doing so
would be extending the decision into corre-
sponding action. But it may be that instead
of this particular action a new decision is
made not to have the test. Nevertheless, I
would argue that the first decision is a deci-
sion all the same. This means that we can not
claim that decisions we have only reasoned
about has to be backed up with correspond-
ing action or vice versa. Instead we might
say that decision making involves more or
less explicit reflection, as well as action (in
correspondence or opposition to reflections)
situated in the practicalities of everyday life.
46
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Department for Medical Genetics, at Copenhagen
University.
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Responsibility and
knowledge
Following this argument, there aremany ways of conducting everydaylife, many ways of making “responsi-
ble choices”. Awareness of possible implica-
tions is but one aspect, emotional responses
to life circumstances, possibilities and con-
straints of everyday life, the interests and
needs of a partner or family, are other aspects
that come into play (Cox 1999, Downing, in
prep).
If you accept this way of understanding
decision making, it has implications for how
we argue about responsibility. Firstly, the
ones not actively seeking out information or
knowledge on the disease and living as if no
such thing was at stake in their lives can not
generally be categorised as irresponsible, nor
defensive or repressing. I am not saying that
this may not be an acceptable moral judge-
ment in a particular situation, just warning
against equalling one with the other. Ac-
tually, it seems rather difficult to avoid
knowing something about what is at stake if
people have the slightest awareness of HD
being in the family.8 Ways of dealing with
and reasoning about the disease is usually
part of life through contact with family, how-
ever limited this contact may be. Equally, the
solid media concern with genetic diseases
makes it very difficult to maintain an entire-
ly ignorant position. That it is indeed diffi-
cult to avoid the subject completely is con-
firmed by my contact with people at risk. Al-
though some family members characterise
others as “refusing to deal with HD”, they
still do not appear to refuse or shut the mat-
ter out entirely. Rather, they go about dealing
with HD in less explicit ways, perhaps think-
ing to themselves and talking to one or two
people close to them. They deal with disease
related issues when concrete situations arise,
for example when considering having chil-
dren or when actually pregnant, when start-
ing a relationship, making business invest-
ments etc. Talking to me may be one of the
first steps into the broader public arenas of
HD recognised by others as such. Secondly,
we should not think of persons at risk as hav-
ing to engage in any more conscious and re-
sponsible decision making than the rest of
us. Why should there be ethical and norma-
tive demands put on some people, that for
one cannot be met by means of genetic
knowledge and technology, and secondly are
far more demanding than the ethical and nor-
mative demands put on the rest of us? I have
a young child myself but do not have a life
insurance and rarely remember to put on my
bicycle helmet. No one flinches an eyelid.
Well, maybe a few, but they are not backed
up by an array of public arenas to say what is
morally right. On a societal level, it seems
that an implication of establishing severe
health risk is creating a public arena where-
by some people are subjected to a moral log-
ic defined to a large extent by others who are
not themselves at risk. Entering the public
arena means embarking on the entire pack-
age of deliberations, choices and actions that
follows from this logic. Soon people living at
risk have to justify what is staged as a “per-
sonal choice” publicly (Callon & Rabeha-
risoa 1999, Strathern 2000).
Guilty as charged
Iwould argue that living life involves de-ciding in some sense, in as much as liv-ing one way facilitates and excludes cer-
tain other ways, doing this today, outlines the
possibilities and constraints of tomorrow.
Living without persuing what “that funny
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8 Some people simply do not know about being at risk,
for example if the disease has never been adressed or di-
agnosed in any family member, if they are adopted or for
other reasons have no knowledge about one or both of
their biological parents.
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family thing” might be, carries the potential
for “business as usual” as well as for great
pain. Likewise entering the public arenas of
genetic knowledge, technologies and testing
carries the potential for “deciding and justi-
fying with a view to the future” as well as de-
spair when trapped by its limits. And if we
look at ways HD gets to play a part in
people’s lives there is a further argument
against equalling ignorance with acting irre-
sponsibly. In certain families symptoms typi-
cally come about at a late age, some afflict-
ed members dying for other reasons before
the onset of HD related symptoms. HD may
not always be diagnosed and if so the full
range of consequences may not become solid
knowledge for some time (see Wexler 1996).9
In some families HD is indeed common
knowledge, but it is equally difficult to main-
tain a general judgement when you consider
the arguments about how knowledge, tech-
nology, counselling, decision making are sit-
uated and related parts in complex social
practice. What kind of knowledge, what de-
gree of detail, how closely should scientific
developments be followed for persons at risk
to be sure that they have the foundation to
conduct themselves in a morally impeccable
manner? On the other hand, if you enter the
realm of knowing, the public space of genet-
ics, counselling and activist groups, you can
be certain that there will be others there
wanting to help, but also wanting to set stan-





Summing up: Medical genetics is con-tinuously bringing about knowledgewhile its associated technologies offer
new choices between different courses of ac-
tion. Taken as a whole the public arenas of
HD can be said to prompt persons living at
risk to reflect on their situation and to act in
moral accordance with what they know.
Following this understanding ignorance can
be staged as problematic in as far as it limits
persons at risk in acting responsibly, for ex-
ample towards family and offspring. To put it
differently, you have to make use of genetic
knowledge and technology in order to be liv-
ing and choosing responsibly. But if we
question the notion of knowledge and tech-
nology as true and fixed and show that these
are not beyond uncertainty, ambiguity and
negotiation when used as a basis for respon-
sible decision making, the demand does not
seem entirely justified. The fast changing
and situated nature of knowledge and tech-
nology makes it difficult to maintain that en-
tering the domain of “knowing” assures re-
sponsible decision making in a universal or
absolute manner (Rabinow 1996). The same
way ignorance can not be judged irresponsi-
ble per se. The notion of informed decision
making can be problematised as staging a
moral or ethical demand that neither genetic
testing, associated reproductive technologies
makes it possible to live up to. Nor does liv-
ing in and of itself, if we take life to be both
complex and contradictory. Furthermore, the
way responsibility and decision making is
enacted by people at risk, their families, re-
search and clinical communities, are shaped
by contemporary western notions of autono-
my, individuality and authenticity (Taylor
1991). In my view the modern movement to-
wards a certain kind of autonomy adds an-
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9 Alice Wexler describes how she herself and her imme-
diate family only very gradually, due to various circum-
stances, come to recognise that her mother is suffering
from HD. She is mid-twenties before a final diagnosis is
made and theoretically could have had children by then.
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other piece to the puzzle of understanding
how individuals are responsibilised. We are
commonly met with the “duty to be healthy”
along with the “duty to know”. We even have
to think, feel and act in accordance with such
moral demands in order to establish our-
selves as responsible decision makers.
Which then becomes a further “duty”. These
are powerful “technologies of the self” in our
time, and certainly within the public arenas
of HD. But they are not the only ones. The
notions of autonomy and authenticity also
carries notions of respect for the individual
and his or her choices.
To finish off, I would like to make sure
that my line of argument is not taken as anti-
moralist, or relativist in the sense that any-
thing goes out of respect for individual au-
tonomy. Understanding what moves people
from a 1. person perspective and supporting
their autonomous decision making in coun-
selling does not exclude arguing about
morality or ethics. I cannot develop the argu-
ment in detail here, but I would like to give
an indication of where it is headed. Firstly,
the notions of autonomy and authenticity
themselves rest in part on a moral ideal, they
have emerged historically and are bound up
in striving for better ways of living. Leaving
it up to the individual is a particular enact-
ment of the notions of autonomy and authen-
ticity, which does not save us from dis-
cussing what might be the better way of en-
acting them (Taylor 1991). Secondly, neither
autonomy nor authenticity automatically ex-
clude the notion that we are interrelated with
other individuals. If we are indeed to be un-
derstood as socially embedded, it follows
that we live our lives in social relations
(Holzkamp 1983). In other words, autonomy
does not have to be based on the notion of
the free floating individual, but might be
seen as bound up with the right to expect and
exercise equality and democracy. If we are
dialogical beings, as Charles Taylor claims,
we depend upon each other in order to be au-
thentic (1991). And if we are characterised
by mutuality on a fundamental level, it fol-
lows that we must understand ourselves as
autonomous in the plural (Costall 1995).
Following this argument we are given the
possibility to consider the wider familiar, so-
cial and societal implications of the personal
conduct of life. We can do so without neces-
sarily having to argue against the ideas of au-
tonomy and responsibility. We may apply
these considerations to the decision making
of at risk individuals, researchers, profes-
sionals and policy makers alike. For example
to the decision making with regard to living
at risk, doing research and the possibility for
recasting eugenic practices on a individual
level. I feel obliged as well as compelled to
touch on this discussion, because my area of
research is irreparably bound up in deciding
and acting on life and death. I am conceiving
here of a kind of eugenics not as based on a
hierarchy of races and enacted through dis-
criminatory practices of governments, but as
based on hierarchies of health and normality
of bodily functioning and the decision mak-
ing of individuals. The eugenic as well as
anti-eugenic practices of our time are politi-
cally programmed in subtle but potentially
powerful ways, enacted by persons living
everyday lives in complex social practices.
Because of the room for active anti-eugenic
practices it is not as scary as its predecessor.
Diversity of life is actually valued in a way
that would have been out of the question in
the 1920s and 30s. But still, one of the basic
principles of eugenics is to make judgements
on the worthiness of life on the grounds of
genetic assumptions. As a minimum, such
judgements of worthiness, be it with refer-
ence to racial purity, individual health, qual-
ity of life or cultural preference have to be
qualified and discussed as matters of where
we want to take ourselves and how this can
be done in concretely lived lives of the
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people concerned. At least this seems a
promising way of discussing such difficult
issues, if we do not wish to leave it entirely
up to one or the other standardised prefer-
ences or to individual decision making. If we
accept judgements of the worthiness of life
to be eugenic, in as far as it allows the clas-
sification and dismissal of lives, I think it
sets the stage for a heightened awareness of
our standards for what is deemed worthy,
healthy and normal enough lives to be lived.
More importantly, it enables us to discuss
such standards. As medical genetics increas-
ingly become part of lay-knowledge and of-
fer new forms of technological assistance,
this kind of awareness and discussion be-
comes progressively more necessary. This
way, we may inform our decision making
with discussions of the desirability of conse-
quences in a wider context.
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